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PASSING ETHNOGRAPHIES: RETHINKING THE SITES OF AGENCY 
AND REFLEXIVITY IN A MEDIATED WORLD 
 
[BOOK CHAPTER PUBLISHED IN P. MURPHY AND M. KRAIDY (EDS) 




The problem of ethnography has cast a long shadow over the practice of media and 
cultural studies. The disputes concerning the ethics and epistemological coherence of 
fieldwork that split anthropology in the 1980s seem to have transferred some of their 
force to recent debates about how we can study media audiences across the world. It 
would, however, be a mistake to discuss the epistemology of the media audience as if 
the audience researcher carried a pale version of the colonialist’s historical burden, 
although the rhetoric of some attacks on audience research suggest this (Hartley, 1987 
and 1996; Nightingale, 1996). For that would obscure a more interesting question, 
whose significance stretches well beyond media analysis: what kind of ‘location-
work’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997b: 5) will enable us to address the locational 
complexity which characterises all social and cultural phenomena today, not least 
those marked by the multi-directional flows of media images?  
 
Even when stripped of its colonial connotations, ethnography’s fiction of ‘being there’ 
– ‘there’ where the systematic order of a wider culture is ‘revealed’ to a sensitive 
observer – remains problematic. But its problem can now be seen as a problem for 
conducting any research in today’s dispersed, mediated societies. Put simply: how do 
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we conceive of the order, or system, at work in today’s world, and where do we need 
to be to grasp it better? We can formulate this in more specific ways, for example, as 
the question of how, and from exactly where, can we track the movements which all 
our lives as self-reflexive agents in such societies entail, and the movements across 
our lives of media flows from countless sources?1 Or, recalling Donna Haraway’s 
(1991) provocative term from an earlier, rather different, epistemological crisis: how 
can we produce ‘situated knowledge’ of mediation’s place in the lives of others and 
ourselves? 
 
The study of media, then, is entangled with the problem of ethnography, but in 
interesting ways that transcend old debates on the colonial encounter. The issue of 
complexity, and how to study it, affects all branches of the social sciences and 
humanities that are attempting to give accounts of what goes on ‘inside’ today’s 
‘cultures’ (both sets of scare quotes being necessary). It is a matter of grasping, first, 
as I have said, the complexity of ‘order’ and ‘space’, but also the complexity of 
agency and reflexivity, so we can produce more satisfactory accounts of what 
‘subject’ and ‘object’ of ethnography share. Both, after all, are self-conscious agents 
(Cohen, 1994), who are highly mobile, living and reflecting across many different 
sites. I want to argue that the situated analysis of mediation’s place in our lives has 
resonances for today’s reconceptualisation of ethnography in general (Gupta and 
Ferguson, 1997a; Marcus, 1998), and in particular the shift towards an ethnography 
that is ‘places- rather than place-focused’ (Marcus, 1998: 50).  
 
This chapter will approach these difficult issues in three stages. The first section will 
review the critique of ‘culture’ within anthropology and the ways beyond this critique 
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that have recently suggested a different mode of cultural analysis. The second section 
will explore how that general debate about ‘culture’ plays out when we think 
specifically about mediated culture and media uses: what contribution can media 
anlysis make to an ethnography of ‘places’ within a wider analysis of cultural 
complexity (here, I suggest, anthropology and media and cultural studies are partners, 
not rivals)? The third section will review the method of my own empirical research 
which was at least a partial attempt to address these issues. The chapter will, in these 
various ways, flesh out its title’s metaphor of ‘passing ethnographies’.  
 
Disappearance of the Ethnographic Agent? 
 
The implication of the apparently innocent object of research – ‘cultures’ – in the 
practices which comprised, and in some respects still continue, colonialism is well-
known. As Lila Abu-Lughod has put it: 
 
culture is the essential tool for making other . . . anthropological discourse gives 
cultural difference (and the separation between groups of people it implies) the air 
of the self-evident.  
(Abu-Lughod, 1991: 143, added emphasis) 
 
And not just that: applied to ‘ourselves’, a belief in a distinctive, shared culture is the 
touchstone of nationalism in all its, often disturbing, forms, even if the evidence for 
what it is we share with our compatriots is often problematic or absent (Schudson, 
1994). For some writers, a shared national ‘culture’ is always the projection of a 
mythical unity (Bhabha, 1994; Zizek, 1990), desired but never possible.  
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To say this, however, is only to pose a problem, not to resolve anything. What 
happens when we attempt to study cultural processes without relying on the notion of 
‘cultures’ - that is, stable, coherent, localised ‘units’ of cultural analysis? What are the 
implications for the practice and theory of ethnography, when both its object (a distant 
‘culture’) and its subject (the agent who moves with privileged status outside his/her 
own ‘culture’ to study another) disappear, at least in their familiar forms? 
 
There are no straightforward answers but to move forward we need to draw, for 
example, on the new model of cultural processes and flows developed by Ulf Hannerz 
(see Couldry, 2000b, chapter 5 for more detail). The reasons for this can be seen best, 
if we briefly recall the old model of culture that must be superseded. The older model 
pictures the space of culture primarily in terms of a series of separate ‘cultures’, with 
the interactions between them being of secondary importance. Each ‘culture’ is 
understood as a natural unit: coherent (so that hybrid cultures are an exceptional case), 
and associated with a particular shared place and time.  
 
Paradoxically, that older model on which classical anthropology depended was 
formulated most clearly by its anthropologist critics. As Ulf Hannerz puts it, it is ‘the 
idea of culture as something shared, in the sense of homogeneously distributed in 
society’ (1992: 11, added emphasis). This holistic model (with its ‘fiction of the 
whole’: Marcus, 1998: 33) is supported by various metaphors which James Clifford 
did much to excavate. There is the organic metaphor of culture as growth, ‘a coherent 
body that lives and dies’, or alternatively survives, provided it remains 
uncontaminated by outside influences (1988: 235, 338). Closely linked with growth is 
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the metaphor of place, an issue which will be particularly important in the rest of this 
chapter. Just as every body occupies one, discrete place, so too from the point of view 
of the old notion of culture the ‘place’ of culture is the site where its reality is lived, 
the focus where all the possible lines of diversity in a culture intersect in a unity 
(Auge, 1995: 58). They intersect there, so that they can be ‘read’, a third metaphor: 
‘culture as text’ (ibid.: 49-50), a text with finite boundaries.  
 
These metaphors are problematic not least because they exclude others: metaphors 
emphasising the connections between multiple cultural sites, the uncertainty of 
cultural boundaries, in a sense therefore the opaqueness, not the transparency, of 
culture. The old metaphors encourage us to look for less complexity in cultural 
phenomena, when we should be prepared to look for more.  
 
The old holistic model of culture has, however, been extremely influential not only in 
anthropology, but also in sociology (it was at the root of functionalist models of social 
integration, such as Talcott Parsons’) and cultural studies, where its influence on 
Raymond Williams’ (1958) early account of culture as a way of life is obvious. Yet it 
is clearly inadequate to deal with a world of complex flows of people, images, 
information and goods, in which local culture everywhere incorporates 
‘transculturality’ (Welsch, 1999), and we live in ‘imagined worlds’ that are complex 
amalgams of elements from all over the world (Appadurai, 1990). In this context, the 
idea of culture as necessarily tied to a place can be seen for what it always was: an 
assumption. We must look for cultural processes in different places, or (better) 
through imagining a different relation of cultural production to place and space. If we 
do, then new spaces and new mobilities come into view: Paul Gilroy (1992) has 
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famously argued for the study of the Black Atlantic (a space of passage between 
nations), Marc Auge (1995) has argued for the study of ‘nonplaces’, the ‘cultures’ of 
ordinary places of transit, such as airports, tourist zones, and there are many other 
examples which could be given.  
 
Here, though, a further difficulty with the old metaphors must be addressed, which 
results from debates in spatial theory, rather than anthropology. If ‘culture’ has been 
deconstructed as a simple object, so too has ‘place’. No place, argues Doreen Massey 
(1997), is reducible to a simple narrative, a coherent set of meanings. Places are 
points where many influences, operating on many different scales (up to and 
including the global), intersect. Instead of a traditional notion of ‘place’ as bounded 
locality, we need ‘a global sense of the local’ (1997: 240). In every place, multiple 
scales of connection are overlaid. 
 
Once we complicate our idea of how culture is embedded in place, then we must 
question our assumption that cultures have a simple relation to time. We must for 
example, as Homi Bhabha has argued, raise ‘the essential question of the 
representation of the nation as [itself] a temporal process’ (1994: 142): national 
‘culture’ cannot be reduced to a simple object describable as it exists at one point in 
time. Material processes for constructing past, present and future are wrapped up in 
our sense of the national ‘present’. We have to challenge what Charlotte Brunsdon 
and David Morley called  ‘the myth of ‘‘the nation, now’’’ (1978: 27). And the 
problem of time applies to other descriptive terms as well, including those that try to  
capture the open-ended process of the self, at which point the dimensions of space and 
time become entangled. Quasi-spatial language for describing the self (such as 
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‘subject-positions’) is problematic, precisely because it closes off the self’s reflexive 
processes in time  (Battaglia, 1999: 117; Couldry, 1996: 327).  
 
The result of all these moves is not to divorce our notion of cultural production and 
cultural experience entirely from space, place or time. Rather we need a more 
complex notion of that relation. The question is too complex to resolve in a few 
pages, but one initial consequence is clear: the dissolution of that apparently innocent 
methodological presumption, the ethnographic ‘present’, present ‘there’ in ‘the field’ 
where the ethnographic agent is based.2  
 
To take these thoughts a stage further, I want to draw specifically on Ulf Hannerz’s 
work on cultural space in his important book Cultural Complexity (1992). ‘Complex 
societies’ according to Hannerz are distinctive in a number of ways. Most relevant 
here is the fact that their meanings have to be distributed to that society’s members, 
who are dispersed across space. There is no reason to assume that distribution is even. 
On the contrary, ‘in a society where the cultural flow is varied and uneven, it is an 
open question which meanings have reached where and when’ (Hannerz, 1992: 81). 
But people are not monads taking inputs from the wider culture in isolation from 
everyone else; they are also engaged in making sense of other people’s meanings and 
interpretations (1992: 14). This adds a second layer of complexity to the distribution 
of meanings, which cannot be simply extrapolated from the first: a dimension of 
reflexivity which itself is a material process that takes place here, and not there.  
 
The idea of cultural ‘holism’ – that cultures comprise principally the meanings that 
people share – is thus untenable. As Hannerz puts it: 
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we must recognize the real intricacy of the flow of meaning in social life. As each 
individual engages in his [sic] own continuous interpreting of the forms 
surrounding him, how can we take for granted that he comes to the same result as 
the next fellow [sic]? There is nothing automatic about cultural sharing. Its 
accomplishment must rather be seen as problematic. (1992: 44) 
 
Put another way, our idea of cultures as large-scale structures has to take account of 
the ‘local’ complexity of agents’ reflexivity about culture, not just academics’ 
reflexivity of course, but the reflexivity of every agent they study. Everywhere 
processes of agency and reflexivity intersect. Given the resulting complexity, 
ethnography’s situated knowledge can no longer based on the ethnographer’s 
movement (or lack of it) perfectly tracking culture’s movement (or lack of it). The 
intersection between ‘ethnography’ and ‘culture’ is necessarily more partial than that: 
it takes the form of passing ethnographies, that yield, we hope, knowledge under 
particular conditions.  
 
Accepting partiality in this sense (at the level of guiding metaphor) does not mean 
renouncing claims to generalisable knowledge, as I explain below. But it does mean 
thinking about generality from a starting-point that takes complexity seriously. There 
is no reason any more to suppress or reduce the complexity all around us. Lives are 
stretched across many sites and many roles, without necessarily cohering into a unity; 
communities are not tied to a single nation-state, but are informed by the experience 
of moving between many. We must take seriously ‘identities that resist classification’ 
(Kearney, 1995: 558), which of course may mean working at odds with the 
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definitional strategies of states or markets. We don’t know , and certainly can’t 
assume, that people accept the market-led identities that are prepared for them, which 
means that we must take seriously people’s journey’s across cultural space, whether 
they are voluntary or involuntary. Culture, in short, emerges ‘on a differently 
configured spatial canvas’ (Marcus, 1995: 98) where the connections between sites 
matter as much, and sometimes more, than the sites of imagined closure (the village, 
the city, the nation-state, or even the globe).  
 
The nature of this methodological shift has been brought out well by Anna 
Lowenhaupt Tsing in her (1993) book on her time spent with the Meratus Dayak 
people from the mountainous forest regions of south-east Kalimantan in Indonesia. 
They are in various ways managed and marginalised by the central Indonesian 
Government, but at the same time engage in a complex set of negotiations of their 
identity with many ‘centres’, not just Jakarta, but more locally, and globally. Tsing 
found there were no ‘villages’ to study, but rather a shifting network of cultural 
dialogues across scattered populations. Her own practice – as reflexive ethnographic 
agent – involved ceaseless movement as well. In a powerful passage, Tsing describes 
how her own movements across cultural space made irrelevant the attempt to reduce 
that space to a closed cultural order: 
 
As I involved myself with a network that stretched across the mountains, I moved 
increasingly further from structural models of local stability and came to recognize 
the open-ended dialogues that formed and reformed Meratus culture and history. 
My own shifting positioning made me especially alert to continual negotiations of 
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local ‘community’, to the importance of far-flung as well as local ties . . . a culture 
that cannot be tied to a place cannot be analytically stopped in time.  
        (Tsing, 1993: 66) 
 
I want now to explore what this means specifically for the analysis of mediated 
cultures.  
 
Analysing our Mediated Lives 
 
Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing expresses very clearly that existing notions of how cultural 
analysis fits with reality are inadequate. Tsing was, however, in one respect writing 
still in a classic ethnographic situation, one that was not intensely mediated. 
Mediation, as communication which crosses contexts and borders in pervasive and 
regular ways, changes the boundaries of the ethnographic situation, just as it changes 
the boundaries of the political situation, the family situation, and the educational 
situation (Meyrowitz, 1985). The consequences of this for ethnographic practice have 
only recently been explored.  
 
Lila Abu-Lughod, whose subtle work on television audiences in Egypt has been 
important here, has recently argued that television is in fact central to ethnographic 
practice today. Television often provides a ready-made link between ethnographers 
and their subjects (1999: 111), of a sort that earlier ethnographers in ‘strange’ 
countries could never call upon. More than that, television - as its genres, styles and 
knowledges and often, of course, specific programmes too) cross the world - has 
reconfigured the cultural space which ethnographers need to cross. As a result, 
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Clifford Geertz’s famous methodological tool of ‘thick description’ (which Abu-
Lughod endorses) ‘needs some creative stretching to fit mass-mediated lives’ (1999: 
111). This raises a question: where exactly is the entry-point for ethnography in 
studying ‘the significance of television’s existence as a ubiquitous presence in 
[people’s] lives and imaginaries’? (1999: 111). Or, more bluntly: thick descriptions of 
what? 
 
On the face of it, there is common ground between anthropology and the significant 
tradition of situated qualitative research in media sociology since the mid 1980s. It is 
unfortunate therefore that Abu-Lughod undermines this ground through a very partial 
account of media sociology.  She takes no account of the methodological debates in 
audience research about the difficulties of fully contextualising research into audience 
practices in the home (Morley and Silverstone, 1991; Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley, 
1991); this makes unfair her criticism of certain texts (such as Silverstone, 1994) 
which never purport to offer fresh ethnographic work themselves. Her analysis seems 
designed to create the space for anthropology ‘proper’ to do fully contextualised 
research into media consumption, as if for the first time. There are two problems with 
this position, in addition to its very partial account of the work already done in 
audience research: first, it operates within a rather polarised view of the boundaries 
between anthropological work and media and cultural studies, which is no longer 
helpful (cf Thomas, 1999); secondly, it implicitly makes a claim for methodological 
advances in Abu-Lughod’s own work which seem rather exaggerated. Her analysis in 
the same chapter of audiences and producers of the Egyptian television drama 
Mothers in the House of Love is certainly suggestive in detail and it is a ‘mobile 
ethnography’ (Abu-Lughod, 1999: 122) in the limited sense that the ethnographer 
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moves between locations, asking questions. But it provides no account, for example, 
of the mobility of the people it studies, of how people’s interpretations of the serial 
might change as they interpret it in different contexts, or of how media themselves 
might affect the circulation of interpretations in significant ways. While Abu-
Lughod’s recognition of mediation’s centrality to ethnographic method is welcome, 
we need, I suggest, to turn elsewhere to clarify exactly how that relationship should 
work. 
 
An important advance is represented by George Marcus’s essay ‘The Use of 
Complicity in the Changing Mise-en-Scene of Anthropological Fieldwork’ (1999).  
This is a thoroughgoing rethinking of what ‘thick description’ can mean in today’s 
complex cultural spaces. Marcus abandons the idea that what is feasible or desirable 
in fieldwork is ‘rapport’, that is, a close fit between the ethnographer’s and her/his 
interlocutor’s understandings of the world, achieved within the confines of the 
ethnographic situation. Instead of ‘rapport’ as the ‘foundational commonplace of 
fieldwork’ (1999: 87), Marcus develops the notion of ‘complicity’, which emphasises 
not the knowledge, so much as the questioning and curiosity, that ethnographer and 
interlocutor share.3  
 
Marcus’ first characterisation of this ‘complicity’ is as ‘an awareness of existential 
doubleness on the part of both anthropologist and subject; this derives from having a 
sense of being here where major transformations are under way that are tied to things 
happening simultaneously elsewhere, but not having a certainty or authoritative 
representation of what those connections are’ (Marcus, 1999: 97, original emphasis). 
The result of this uncertainty may be anxiety (1999: 98), as well as a shared sense of 
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questioning that extends far beyond the dilemmas of the (post-)colonial encounter. 
Indeed, the uncertainty which the interlocutor feels is not the product of being 
approached by the ethnographer at all; it is a pre-existing condition of any self-
reflexive life in a world of complex cultural flows and influences. It is this self-
reflexiveness and uncertainty within everyday life that the ethnographer has to reflect 
in her or his accounts.  
 
The result, Marcus argues, is to change the focus of fieldwork itself:  
 
Only when an outsider begins to relate to a subject also concerned with outsideness 
in everyday life can these expressions [of anxiety] be given focal importance in a 
localized fieldwork that, in turn, inevitably pushes the entire research programme 
of the single ethnographic project into the challenges and promises of a multisited 
space and trajectory – a trajectory that encourages the ethnographer literally to 
move to other sites that are powerfully registered in the local knowledge of an 
originating locus of fieldwork.  
      (Marcus, 1999: 99) 
 
What the two figures in the ethnographic ‘situation’ share, then, is ‘an affinity’, based 
on their ‘mutual curiosity and anxiety about their relationship to a “third”’ – that is, to 
the sites elsewhere that affect, or even determine, their experiences and knowledges 
here (1999: 101). When the anthropologist travels, she is not therefore doing 
something exclusive to the (still generally privileged) position of the anthropologist, 
but instead she is materializing a concern with external determinations that is shared 
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with her interlocutor. This, at least, is the intriguing alternative metaphor for 
fieldwork that Marcus offers.  
 
It is a powerful analysis because it takes seriously the mobile reflexivity and agency 
of both ethnographer and interlocutor; and because it emphasises that the 
ethnographer’s discourse must be adequate to the doubts and uncertainties already 
lived by the interlocutor (cf Battaglia, 1999: 115). Complexity and uncertainty, in 
other words, are not just an academic projection onto the world, but already woven 
into the fabric of everyday life, part of what situated knowledge must capture. 
Crucially, however, Marcus’ analysis emphasises not only doubt, but knowledge. 
Ethnographer and interlocutor are perplexed precisely because they both want to 
know something that holds true beyond their own partial situation. A romanticisation 
of the purely local is not Marcus’ point, nor could that satisfactorily reflect our 
attempts to make sense of a complex, largely opaque world (hence the failure of 
visions of anthropology based on avoiding ‘representation’ entirely, such as Tyler 
(1986)). We try, even if we often fail, to make sense of our location in ‘places [that 
are] simultaneously and complexly connected, by intended and unintended 
consequences’ (Marcus, 1998: 551). Ethnography must aim to do no less.  
 
While this new conception of ethnography has roots going back for example to 
Hannerz’s early work on our dispersed lives in the modern city (1980), that long 
predate recent concerns with mediation in anthropology, it is peculiarly apposite to 
today’s concern with the media’s role in our lives. The media operate as a ‘third’ 
space within our lives, both close and distant, and whether we are ethnographers or 
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not - a paradox which Raymond Williams expressed better than anyone, when he 
described modern communications as: 
 
a form of unevenly shared consciousness of persistently external events. It is what 
appears to happen, in these powerfully transmitted and mediated ways, in a world 
within which we have no other perceptible connections but we feel is at once 
central and marginal to our lives.  
     (Williams, 1973: 295-96, added emphasis) 
 
Media provide common contexts, language and reference-points for use in local 
situations, even though media production takes place outside most localities and its 
narratives cut across them from the outside.  The frameworks within which we reflect 
on ourselves and others are shared with others, because they have a common source in 
media flows, and yet those frameworks are never entirely ‘ours’; we can grasp them 
alternately as ‘inside’ or ‘outside’. Indeed ‘complicity’ (in Marcus’ sense – of a 
shared awareness of the importance to us as agents of the external forces that act upon 
and across us) may be a useful metaphor precisely for the ways in which city life itself 
has been changed by mediation. As Nestor Garcia Canclini has put it: 
 
Since . . . even the accidents that happened the previous day in our own city reach 
us through the media, these [the media] become the dominant constituents of the 
‘public’ meaning of the city . . . More than an absolute substitution of urban life by 
the audiovisual media, I perceive a game of echoes. The commercial advertising 
and political slogans that we see on television are those that we reencounter in the 
streets, and vice versa: the ones are echoed in the others. To this circularity of the 
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communicational and the urban are subordinated the testimonies of history and the 
public meaning constructed in longtime [sic] experiences.  
    (Garcia Canclini, 1995: 210, 212, original emphasis)  
 
The media, in other words, by providing so many shared resources through which we 
can (and in a sense must) frame the social world, change the terms on which we can 
offer individual testimony as well. Our sense of public history has already been 
displaced before we can articulate our personal place within it. If so, media’s 
implications for ethnography go well beyond the problems of studying the immediate 
viewing situation in the living-room. 
 
We need an ethnography that adequately reflects the complexity of how media flows 
together produce the mediation of our social life (cf Martin-Barbero, 1993). At the 
very least, this requires a methodology that recognises the stretched-out nature of that 
process of mediation: encompassing not only the stereotypical site of media 
consumption (the home), but also the countless other sites where media circulate (the 
street, the shop, the office, the bar, and so on), the sites of media production (the 
studio, the live event), and those hybrid sites where audience members travel to see 
the process of production close up.  
 
Before I explore some of these possibilities in more detail, let me make one broader 
point which explains why studying such complexity in the mediated landscape is 
more than academic self-indulgence. ‘Ethnography’ - seen in Marcus’ terms, as a 
commitment to grasp the situated reflexivity of actual agents – is part of what 
elsewhere I have called the ‘principle of accountability’ in cultural research (Couldry, 
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2000b: chapter 6). Quite simply: the language and theoretical framework with which 
we analyse others should always be consistent with, or accountable to, the language 
and theoretical framework with which we would hope to analyse ourselves. And, 
equally, in reverse: the language and theoretical framework with which we analyse 
ourselves should always be accountable to the language and theoretical framework 
with which we analyse others.  
 
The reversability of the principle is crucial: it is this that prevents us from falling into 
a spiral of endless self-interrogation, never to resurface! There must be a dialectic 
between the way we think about others and the way we think about ourselves; what 
we say about one must reflect what we know about the complexities of the other. Put 
another way: 
 
• every attempt to speak in one’s own name is tied to an obligation to listen to the 
voices of others; and 
• every attempt to describe others must allow them the complexity of voice that one 
requires to be acknowledged in oneself. 
 
Deliberately here I am combining ethical issues with methodological ones. The 
methodological challenge to grasp the real complexity of ‘cultures’ only has force 
because we in turn recognise the ethical obligation to listen to (multiple) others. In our 
commitment to account for how we think about self and others, methodology and 
ethics converge. We cannot, as analysts, safely turn our backs on the complexity 
which mediated cultures display.  
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Passing Ethnography, or Notes on an Emergent Method 
 
I want now to reflect in some detail on my own attempt to research aspects of 
mediated culture in The Place of Media Power (Couldry, 2000a). The strategies I 
adopted and their limitations are, I would suggest, relevant to the wider questions – of 
the role of ethnography in media sociology, and the development of ethnography 
generally – which this chapter has tried to address.  
 
My starting-points, long before I formulated my exact research strategy, were, first, a 
commitment to the underlying principle of audience research as practised by David 
Morley and others – that is, a commitment to the empirical study of how actual people 
put media texts to use in their lives – but, second, a concern about whether detailed 
study of how particular texts are interpreted in particular contexts can answer the 
question that, in Britain at least, audience research was designed to address: the role 
of media in the legitimation of wider power structures and inequalities.4 There is a 
gap between the ambitions of audience research and its actual achievements, given the 
limitations which it initially imposed upon itself. None of which means that media are 
without social impacts, only that there is a question about the best entry-point for 
analysing them (I agree with Lila Abu-Lughod to this extent).  
 
I tried to answer that question in my research through two moves (this, perhaps, is to 
give more order retrospectively to my strategy than it had at the time). First, I had the 
hunch (later developed as a theory: Couldry, 2000a, chapter 3) that one way to 
research the media’s social impacts was to look at how media institutions and media 
people are thought about: what, in other words, are our beliefs about media power and 
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how do they contribute to the usual legitimation of that power? My research therefore 
aimed to find moments where the vast, society-wide process of legitimating media 
power was explicitly articulated or at least could be traced in behaviour and language. 
Second, I had the hunch (see Couldry, 2000a, chapter 2) that, while mediation has 
very broad impacts on a territory such as Britain, those impacts are never simple or 
even, and therefore that there must be moments – or rather sites – where the 
legitimation of media power is open to challenge, or is negotiated in some way: 
fissures, if you like, where, as in Victor Turner’s (1974) model of liminal behaviour, 
wider structural patterns are revealed.  
 
The result of these two hunches was to encourage me to research not conventional 
sites of media reception or production, important though these are, but instead more 
exceptional sites where the status of media institutions and media authority was in 
some way negotiated, whether playfully or seriously. Hence my choice of two very 
different situations for field research: first, leisure sites where people get close up to 
the process of media production, such as Granada Studios Tour in Manchester, which 
contains the set of Britain’s longest-running prime-time soap opera, Coronation Street 
(the American parallels, while not exact, would include Universal Studios in Florida 
and NBC Studios Tour in New York: Couldry, 2000a: 65-66); and, second, protest 
sites where people without media experience became involved in a mediated event 
and therefore saw the media process close up. In the latter case, my fieldwork was 
inevitably limited by what protests were under way at the time of the research, and my 
main research was on people’s reflections about a protest that was completed the year 
before my fieldwork, the protests against the export of live animals through the small 
East coast port of Brightlingsea in 1995. Since the detailed political context of these 
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protests was not my main concern, but rather their status as an access-point to the 
media process, I will not detail it further here (but see Couldry, 2000a: 123-124). 
 
My approach to such sites was on the face of it based on conflicting principles: on the 
one hand, I wanted to do as detailed a contextual analysis as possible of why people 
visited Granada Studios Tour and how people understood their experience of 
participating in the mediated protests at Brightlingsea, since it was through their 
detailed accounts of those localized encounters that I hoped to obtain insights into 
people’s orientations towards media institutions in general. On the other hand, both 
types of site were temporary, in the sense that my interviewees had merely passed 
through them, either in the space of a day (as at Granada Studios Tour) or over the 
space of a few months (as at Brightlingsea).  They were not the type of permanent 
living or working space in which ethnography has normally been conducted. Their 
interest was precisely as exceptional sites, which meant that they could not be fully 
contextualised in the lives of their participants, or indeed fully contextualised at all. 
(Which is not to say that they were exceptional in exactly the same way: the 
Brighlingsea protest site was a space closely linked to a real, inhabited place, whereas 
Granada Studios Tour was much closer to a ‘nonplace’ in Auge’s (1995) sense.)5 I 
was drawn, in other words, to do a maximally contextual study of sites which lacked a 
full context, a quasi-ethnography that I decided was better not called an ethnography 
at all (2000a: 198).6 Only much later did I realise that it had parallels with the shift in 
1990s anthropology to a pluralistic notion of ethnography that might include the study 
of ‘accidental communities of memory’(Malkki, 1997: 91) such as those formed at 
Granada Studios Tour and Brightlingsea.  
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In any case, the apparent theoretical contradiction was less intractable in practice. 
First of all, I was quite clear that these sites were worth studying – they were public 
sites where significant events or practices occurred, the like of which had rarely been 
researched. Second, I was convinced that ethnography in the sense of total immersion 
in what happened at such sites was in principle impossible. Granada Studios Tour was 
a commercial site visited by up to 6,000 people a day, well beyond the grasp of even 
the largest army of ethnographers; and the protests at Brightlingsea were already 
firmly in the past, even if the recent past. Ethnography on the traditional model could 
not then be the answer to the methodological problems posed by researching those 
sites, and yet those problems were surely typical of many other non-trivial sites of 
‘sociality’ where people come together on a temporary basis, often without 
knowledge of each other’s full context for being there (cf Maffesoli, 1996). If such 
sites were significant, yet not susceptible even in principle to ethnographic work in 
the traditional sense, then a different possibility, and necessity, was opening up for 
qualitative research.   
 
This alternative model – which I can now see as a version of Marcus’ ethnography as 
‘complicity’, not ‘rapport’ – involved renouncing the aim for an impossible 
immersion in context and instead seeking as much context as could reasonably be 
obtained. I pursued this in various ways. For the sites themselves, I relied on 
participant observation (at Granada Studios Tour) or (at Brightlingsea) on a mixture 
of observations and close study of local and national press materials on the protest. 
From interviewees, I obtained, where possible, long open-ended interviews, usually in 
their own homes. At Brightlingsea this was my main source, but at Granada Studios 
Tour the home interviews were a supplement to a large number of interviews 
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conducted on site. Unfortunately in the latter case, there was only one person 
interviewed on site who was willing to meet me again at home: not surprisingly, since 
Granada Studios Tour represents precisely a day-off from commitments! This 
however revealed, in another guise, the limits to ‘ethnographic’ context built into the 
very structure of this particular public site. My third source of context was provided 
by the interviewees themselves, as they reflected on their engagement with the site in 
question. They chose the relevant context within which to talk about their time at the 
studios or on the protest. They could have related it to any event in their lives 
whatsoever, but it was the context they chose, usually in retrospect, in which I was 
most interested.  
 
A full ethnographic context for their visit to Granada Studios Tour or the protest 
experience at Brightlingsea was in principle impossible, but this did not mean that the 
context obtained was trivial. On the contrary, it was useful evidence of what the site 
had meant to those I interviewed. In effect, by pursuing this strategy, I made a choice. 
I could have chosen a radical contextualist approach (cf Ang, 1996), which might 
have led me to abandon research altogether – since the context available was never 
going to be complete enough! Instead, I took a more pragmatic approach, working in 
each case with what context I could obtain, and building up from there a larger picture 
of the way people talked about those sites, and the patterns in such talk.  
 
That choice was grounded in a growing sense that there was a striking pattern, even 
or, especially, at the level of the banal language people used about those sites and 
their significance (cf Couldry, 2000a: 104-5, 143-4, 197 for further explanation). It 
was this patterning, and its pervasiveness, that was the most important aspect of the 
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various interviews and observations I had conducted: a wider pattern that did not 
contradict or undermine the self-reflexivity of those I interviewed, but which instead 
worked itself out through their reflections. Indeed such patterns of thinking – their 
characteristic categories, such as the underlying hierarchy between ‘media world’ and 
‘ordinary world’ (Couldry, 2000a: chapter 3) – emerged most strongly in the passages 
where they were put under greatest pressure by the interviewees themselves, by being 
argued with or renegotiated. Rarely, however, were those patterns entirely 
deconstructed, or absent; and this, I realised, was the wider point towards which my 
scattered quasi-ethnography was leading. 
 
In effect, I had conducted a contextualised, multisited study of people’s talk about 
visits to two sites (not themselves connected), that revealed patterns of thinking that 
were more than just multisited: they were the type of pervasive and banal categories 
(Billig, 1995) through which wider ideological structures get produced, in this case 
the ideology of media power. To grasp such patterns, and their influence, we need 
paradoxically, to study them in action, as they are put to work in particular cases. This 
means doing research in multiple contexts that have to be grasped as rhetorical 
contexts – as contexts of argument and negotiation – which is not the same as 
knowing the total life-context in which those arguments took place. Listening closely 
and effectively to people’s talk need not require (and, in practice, usually cannot 
involve) a full ethnographic contextualisation for that talk.  
 
Only through work across a number of such contexts (without necessarily immersing 
myself in any of them) could I grasp the patterning of language, thought, and action, 
through which media power is reproduced and legitimated. The ‘place of media 
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power’, I had discovered, is latent everywhere, even if our naturalised beliefs about 
the media emerge most clearly at those place (for example, sites of media production) 




These reflections on my own research might seem a long way from the traditional 
notion of ethnographic method: the ambition for what Marcus calls ‘rapport’ within 
the ethnographic situation. My approach has tried rather to engage with as much 
context as is available for some of the passing acts and reflections we make as we 
pass through a mediated world. The result is a passing ‘ethnography’, but one no less 
serious for that. It represents a serious commitment to engage with the texture of our 
dispersed but mediated lives. And it is a real ethnography, if we accept George 
Marcus’ wider rethinking of what ethnography entails: an engagement with the 
situations of others based in a shared attention to the complex webs of determination 
within which we think and act. This involves qualitative work that crosses a number 
of places, and travels to some which we would not necessarily first think of as sites 
where we engage with media.   
 
Even so, it might seem that this new dispersed notion of ethnography and in particular 
media ethnography has sidestepped some important questions of politics. Even if ‘the 
circumstantial commitments that arise in the mobility of multi-sited fieldwork provide 
a kind of psychological substitute for the reassuring sense of “being there” of 
participation in traditional single-site fieldwork’(Marcus, 1998: 99), too mobile an 
ethnography of mediated space risks running free of the ethical questions which the 
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ethnographic encounter so powerfully brought into focus. It is important to emphasise 
therefore that what I am not arguing for is a footloose analysis that follows media 
images wherever it chooses. Our sense of complexity, and why studying complexity 
matters, must be more grounded than that.  
 
It should be grounded in an awareness that it matters to study power, and its disguises. 
Media have the vast power that they do, because we all, systematically even if usually 
unobtrusively, work to produce their authority as natural (Couldry, 2000a: chapter 1). 
Our presence as analysts at one place (whether it is the home or the studio) will not be 
sufficient to unlock the workings of media power. To believe otherwise would 
ironically be to reproduce the type of mystification upon which media power itself 
relies:7 that there is one place, the place in the media, where society’s important things 
happen, the myth that it matters to ‘be there’. If we are fully to understand the 
dispersed symbolic order that underlies the media’s myth-making powers, we must 
avoid the old ethnographic myth that we can only do so by ‘being there’ ourselves. 
 




Many thanks to the editors of this volume, Patrick Murphy and Marwan Kraidy, for 
the helpful criticisms of an earlier draft that allowed me to sharpen its argument. 
Thanks also to Roger Silverstone whose comments on my earlier research sparked, 





Abu-Lughod, L. (1991. Writing against culture. In R. Fox (ed) Recapturing 
Anthropology: Writing in the Present. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press. 
 
Abu-Lughod, L. (1999). The interpretation of culture(s) after television. In S. Ortner 
(ed) The Fate of “Culture”: Geertz and Beyond. Berkeley: University of Californias 
Press. 
 
Ang, Ien (1996). Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern 
World. London: Routledge. 
 
Appadurai, A (1990). Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. In 
M. Featherstone (ed) Global Culture. London: Sage. 
 
Auge, M (1995). Non-places: an Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. 
London: Verso.  
 
Battaglia, D (1999). Towards an ethics of the open subject: writing culture in good 
conscience. In H. Moore (ed) Anthropological Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Bhabha, H. (1994). The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. 
 
Billig, M (1995).Banal Nationalism. London:  Routledge.  
 
 27
Brunsdon, C. & Morley, D. (1978). Everyday Television: Nationwide. London: BFI. 
 
Clifford, J (1988). The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, 
Literature and Art. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Cohen, A. (1994). Self-consciousness: an Alternative Anthropology of Identity. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Couldry, N. (1996). Speaking of others and speaking personally: reflections after 
Elspeth Probyn’s Sexing The Self.  Cultural Studies, 10(2), 315-33. 
 
Couldry, N (2000a). The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media 
Age. London: Routledge. 
 
Couldry, N (2000b). Inside Culture: Reimagining the Method of Cultural Studies. 
London: Sage. 
 
Couldry, N (forthcoming, 2001). The Hidden Injuries of Media Power. Journal of 
Consumer Culture 1(2).  
 
Garcia Canclini, N (1995). Hybrid Cultures. Minneapolis MN: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
Gillespie, M (1995). Television Ethnicity and Cultural Change. London : Routledge. 
 
 28
Gilroy, P (1992). The Black Atlantic. London: Verso. 
 
Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J (eds) (1997a) Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and 
Grounds of a Field Science. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J (1997b) Discipline and practice: “the field” as site, Method 
and location in anthropology. In A. Gupta and J. Ferguson (eds) (1997a) 
Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Hannerz, U. (1992). Exploring the City. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Hannerz, U. (1992). Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organisation of 
Meaning. New York: Columbia University Press.. 
 
Haraway, D (1991). Situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the 
principle of partial perspective.  In Simians Cyborgs and Women. London: The Free 
Press. 
 
Hartley, J (1987). Invisible Fictions. Textual Practice, 2: 121-138. 
 
Hartley, J. (1996). Popular Reality. London: Arnold. 
 
Kearney, M. (1995). The local and the global: the anthropology of globalisation and 
transnationalism. Annual Review of Anthropology, 24, 547-65. 
 29
 
Maffesoli, M (1996). The Time of the Tribes. London: Sage. 
 
Malkki, Lisa (1997). News and culture: transitory phenomena and the fieldwork 
tradition. In A. Gupta and J. Ferguson (eds) (1997a) Anthropological Locations: 
Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Marcus, G. (1995). Ethnography in/of the world system: the emergence of multi-sited 
ethnography. Annual Review of Anthropology, 24, 95-117. 
 
Marcus, G (1998). Ethnography Through Thick and Thin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Marcus, G. (1999). The uses of complicity in the changing mise-en-scene of 
anthropological fieldwork. In S. Ortner (ed) The Fate of “Culture”: Geertz and 
Beyond. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Martin-Barbero, J. (1993).Communication Culture and Hegemony. London: Sage. 
 
Massey, D. (1997) [1991]. A global sense of place. In A. Gray and J. McGuigan (eds)  
Studying Culture: An Introductory Reader. London: Arnold. 
 
Meyrowitz, J. (1985). No Sense of Place. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 30
Morley, D. & Silverstone, R. (1991) Communication and context: ethnographic 
perspectives on the media audience. In K.-B. Jensen and N. Jankowski (eds) A 
Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communication Research.  
London: Routledge. 
 
Nightingale, V. (1996). Studying Audiences: The Shock of the Real. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Rabinow, P (1996) Essays on the Anthropology of Reason. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Schudson, M (1994). Culture and the integration of national societies. In D. Crane 
(ed) The Sociology of Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Silverstone, R. (1994). Television and Everyday Life. London: Routledge. 
 
Silverstone, R., Hirsch, E. & Morley, D. (1991). Listening to a long conversation: an 
ethnographic approach to the study of information and communications technologies 
in the home. Cultural Studies, 5, 204-227. 
 
Thomas, N. (1999) Becoming undisciplined: anthropology and cultural studies. In H. 
Moore (ed) Anthropological Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity. 
 




Turner, V. (1974). Dramas Fields and Metaphors. Cornell: Cornell University Press. 
 
Tyler, S. (1986). Post-modern ethnography: from document of the occult to occult 
document. In J. Clifford and G. Marcus (eds) Writing Culture. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Urry, J. (2000). Sociology Beyond Societies. London: Routledge. 
 
Welsch, W. (1999). Transculturality: the puzzling form of cultures today. In M. 
Featherstone and S. Lash (eds) Spaces of Culture: City – Nation - World. London: 
Sage. 
 
Williams, R. (1958). Culture and Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Williams, R. (1973). The Country and the City. London: The Hogarth Press. 
 









                                                          
1
 I am using the term ‘societies’ here guardedly, as there is a growing debate about its usefulness (Urry, 
2000).  
2
 For an important exploration of the problems with the classic ethnographic notion of ‘the field’, see 
the essays in Gupta and Ferguson (1997a). 
 
3




 For a valuable restatement of the values of the ‘critical’ audience research tradition, which is clear 
about the methodological challenges it has faced, see Ang (1996). 
5
 Thanks to Roger Silverstone for drawing my attention to this point. 
 
6
 I was aware of the valid criticisms of some inflated claims for ethnographic research in media studies. 
See for example Gillespie, 1995: 23; Nightingale, 1996: 110-112. 
7
 Like Marcus, I am interested in a ‘grounded study of the mystifications’ of culture. In my case it is 
‘media culture’ and  in Marcus’s case, it is ‘capitalist culture’: see Marcus (1998: 159 n2).  
